Avraham's One Village - JEWISH & benei Noach's ONE VILLAGE Barukh haba: Middle East

Jonathan Spyer, "Subtly and determinedly, Syria is taking over Lebanon".

Fri, 08 Aug 2008 07:25:20 GMT

Subtly and determinedly, Syria is taking over Lebanon
Jonathan Spyer
The Jerusalem Post
August 7, 2008

Lebanese President Michel Suleiman is to visit Syria next week, to discuss the opening of diplomatic relations between the countries, a Lebanese official told reporters this week.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy last month hailed President Bashar Assad's expression of willingness in principle to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon as "historic progress."

The establishment of a first-ever Syrian Embassy in Beirut is probably not imminent, for various reasons. Nevertheless, the signs of normalization in relations between Syria and Lebanon are significant. They are the latest indication of Syria's growing confidence, and far from being a harbinger of more peaceful times in the neighborhood, they offer clues as to the shape of possible further strife.

The formation of the new Lebanese government after the Beirut clashes in May represented a very significant gain for the pro-Syria element in Lebanese politics. Hizbullah now controls a blocking 11 of the 30 cabinet seats. With a Lebanese government of this type, there is no reason for Syria to be in dispute there. The short period when Damascus felt the need to express its will in Lebanon solely in a clandestine way is drawing to a close.

Still, Western hopes for the rapid establishment of formal relations between the two countries are probably exaggerated. Damascus is in no hurry. Syria's return to Lebanon is a work in progress. Assad has listed the preconditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations to become a real possibility. These include the passing of an election law, and the holding of the scheduled May 2009 general election.

Behind Assad's honeyed words, one may glimpse the contours of Syrian strategy in the next stage. The election of May 2009 will be conducted under the shadow of Hizbullah's independent and now untouchable military capability.

Intimidation will go hand in hand with the real kudos gained by the movement and its allies because of recent events - including the prisoner swap with Israel, and the Doha agreement that followed the fighting in May. The result, the Syrians hope, will be the establishment of a government more fully dominated by Hizbullah and its allies, in which the pro-Western element will have been marginalized.

Such a government would mark the effective final reversal of the events of the spring of 2005, when the Cedar Revolution compelled the Syrian army to leave Lebanon. Damascus would then go on to conduct friendly and fraternal relations with the new order in Beirut. Mission accomplished.

If this strategy plays out, however, it will represent not the normalization of Syrian-Lebanese relations, but rather the enveloping of Lebanon into the regional alliance led by Iran, of which Syria is a senior member.

On the ground in Lebanon, this regional alliance is still engaged in consolidating its gains. The lines separating the official Lebanese state from the para-state established by Hizbullah continue to blur. The new government's draft policy statement, which is still to be discussed by the parliament, supports the "right of Lebanon's people, the army and the Resistance to liberate all its territories."

This statement thus nominally affords the Resistance. i.e. Hizbullah, equal status with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and appears to consider it an organ of official government policy.

The new organ of government policy, meanwhile, is building its strength. Ostensibly for the mission of "liberating" 20 square kilometers of border farmland, Hizbullah has built a capability of 40,000 missiles and rockets, is frenziedly recruiting and training new fighters, and is expanding and developing its command and logistics center in the Bekaa.

The latest talk is of Iranian-Syrian plans to supply Hizbullah with an advanced anti-aircraft capacity that would provide aerial defense to the investment in rockets and missiles. Such a move would represent a grave altering of the balance of power. Serious moves towards it could well prove the spark for the next confrontation.

In all its moves, the Iranian-Syrian-Hizbullah alliance has known how to combine brutal military tactics on the ground with subtle and determined diplomacy. Its willingness to throw away the rule book governing the normal relations between states has been perhaps its greatest advantage. While the West sees states as fixed entities possessing certain basic rights, Iran and Syria see only processes of rising and falling power. They see themselves as the force on the rise, and the niceties of internationally fixed borders as a trifle unworthy of consideration.

The region has known the rise of similar systems of power and ideology in the past. Experience shows that such states and alliances have become amenable to change and compromise - if at all - only after experiencing defeat, setback and frustration.

The Syrians and their allies, of course, are far weaker in measurable military and societal terms than their rhetoric would suggest. Western (including Israeli) actions over the last years have tended to blur this fact. The general acceptance of the transformation of Lebanon into a platform for this alliance - and the lauding of it as 'historical progress' - is the latest example of this. The reacquaintance of rhetoric with reality on all sides is long overdue.

Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya Israel.

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Jonathan Spyer, "We'll take the dowry - you keep the bride"

Wed, 06 Aug 2008 22:00:12 GMT

We'll take the dowry - you keep the bride
Jonathan Spyer
The Jerusalem Post
July 31, 2008

A fourth round of indirect talks between Syrian and Israeli representatives was concluded in Istanbul this week and as the Turkish mediators kept themselves in shape conveying messages between the hotel rooms of the two countries' delegations, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was keen to stress the urgency of the hour.

The time was approaching, the prime minister said, when gestures would no longer be enough. Rather, it would soon be time for the Syrians to make their choice between the "Iranian grip" and their partnership in the "axis of evil," and rejoining the "family of nations" in pursuit of peace and "economic development."

Actions and statements from Syria and its allies, however, convey a distinctly less pressing sense of the negotiations. More indirect contacts have been tentatively scheduled for later this month, but for the Syrians, the already considerable benefits derived from the very act of talking are more important than the talks themselves. Damascus's allies in Iran have also given no sign of real concern that their most important Arab allies are about to jump ship.

Damascus's main aim in entering the talks was to use them as a means to rebuild relations with the US and other Western powers, in particular France. These reached a nadir in recent years, most importantly because of Syrian subversion in Lebanon, and suspicions of Damascus's involvement in the murder of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and a string of subsequent political murders in that country. Syria is determined to prevent the functioning of the international tribunal into the Hariri murder.

The talks with Israel are intended to demonstrate Syria's willingness to conform with Western hopes for a peace breakthrough in the region. They are part of a sort of "carrot and stick" strategy pursued by Syria, whereby its clients - for example Hizbullah - make tangible gains through the brute employment of political violence. Once it has been established that Syria and its friends cannot be ignored, Damascus then sets out to reap diplomatic gains by offering a cautious hand of reconciliation.

But this hand of reconciliation is intended to add a layer to the gains achieved through violence - not to bargain them away. This strategy has served Syria well in the past. It has been likened to an arsonist who offers his service to the fire brigade.

With regard to Syria's contact with Israel, the terms have been clear from the outset. Damascus is in no hurry. Syrian officials, speaking in Arabic, have made clear that they believe the negotiations would likely take between one and three years for completion, and that no summit meeting would be likely in the foreseeable future.

The Syrians have also made clear that Damascus's long-standing alliance with Iran is not a subject of discussion in the talks, which are concerned with regaining the Golan Heights by Syria only. As Samir Taqi, the Syrian "independent researcher" who handled the initial contacts preceding the negotiations put it, "It would be naive to think Syria will neglect or abandon its strategic alliances that do not stem from the Arab-Israeli conflict."

So far, the strategy seems to be paying dividends. For the cost of the flight tickets and hotel rooms in Istanbul, Assad has ended Syria's isolation. He and his wife found themselves feted in Paris in early July where Syria was welcomed into French President Sarkozy's new Mediterranean Forum. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem beamed after his meetings with French officials that the Hariri tribunal had not even been mentioned.

The reception in Washington has been more cautious, of course. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welsh made it clear that he was not prepared to meet with Syrian official Riad Daoudi as part of talks with an "unofficial" Syrian delegation in the US last week.

But here, given Syria's projected time frame for negotiations with Israel, it is evident that Damascus is looking beyond its foes in the Bush Administration. Assad evidently expects a more friendly face in the White House by early 2009, and this offers a further reason for Syria's lack of haste.

With all this rapprochement going on, the alliance with Iran seems safe and sound. Muallem was in Teheran this week, and met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. The two reconfirmed what Ahmedinejad called their "regional cooperation," and the Iranian president lauded the foiling of "the Zionist regime" and America's plans in Lebanon and Syria.

Thus, the act of talking in Istanbul seems a worthy investment. But it is the side benefits of the conversation which interests Damascus.

This was perhaps most eloquently summed up yesterday on the Web site of the official Syrian newspaper Tishreen. While the regional newspaper Sharq al-Awsat devoted two editorials this week to dissecting the negotiations, on the same day that the talks resumed, Tishreen's homepage failed even to acknowledge that they were taking place. Instead, the lead story on its Web site informed readers that his excellency President Bashar Assad met with a delegation of American churchmen. In the meeting, we are told, his excellency stressed the importance of dialogue between nations.

There could be few more eloquent demonstrations of Syrian intentions. When it comes to negotiating with Israel, Assad is keen to take the dowry, while showing little enthusiasm for embracing the bride.

Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya Israel.

Jonathan Spyer, "Analysis: A Success for Hizbullah - and its Price" - Wed, Jul/30/08

Thu, 31 Jul 2008 19:25:38 GMT

Analysis: A Success for Hizbullah - and its Price
Jonathan Spyer
The Jerusalem Post
July 29, 2008

The release of Samir Kuntar and his four colleagues, and the national jubilation that greeted their return to Lebanon, bring to a close a week of achievement for the regional bloc of which Hizbullah is a member. The events of the week, however, do not resolve any of the issues of which they form a part. Rather, they plant the seeds of further confrontation.

After six weeks of disputation, the formation of a new government was announced in Beirut on July 11, with Hizbullah gaining veto power in the new cabinet. The pro-Western parliamentary majority holds 16 cabinet seats, against 11 for the opposition (including Hizbullah) and three named directly by President Michel Suleiman.

This achievement represents success for Hizbullah's campaign of civil disobedience over the last 18 months.

Veto power will enable Hizbullah to protect the independent military infrastructure that it has developed with Iranian and Syrian help - for use against Israel at some future date.

In France, Syrian President Bashar Assad ended four years of isolation with a kingly welcome at the launch of President Nicolas Sarkozy's Mediterranean Forum. The simple act of receiving messages from an adjoining Israeli delegation in an Istanbul hotel appears to have been sufficient to wipe the slate clean, at least in the eyes of Paris. Assad, whose country is strongly suspected of involvement in the deaths of 59 French soldiers in Beirut in 1983, proudly reviewed the serried ranks of the French military assembled for July 14.

Even as Bashar and his wife, Asma, enjoyed the Bastille Day ceremonies, weapons and other aid for Hizbullah continues to make its way across Syria's border with Lebanon, and southward to the movement's strongholds. The organization is thought to have assembled some 40,000 missiles north of the Litani River, unmolested by either the Lebanese army or UNIFIL. The latter, sources suggest, has reached its own uneasy modus vivendi with Hizbullah, rather than risk confronting it.

The return of Kuntar and the prisoners will allow Hizbullah for a moment to present itself once again as the "shield" of Lebanon, achieving shared national goals through the use of its independent military capability.

Yet the singing and dancing in the Druse village of Aabey, as the locals welcome home Samir Kuntar, the son of whom they are so proud, should not be allowed to obscure some notable ambiguities and potential dangers now opening up for Hizbullah.

The movement's planners are thought to consider that another round of fighting with Israel is inevitable. Hizbullah expects that the next time will not be limited to southern Lebanon. Rather, it is likely to spread north and eastward, into Hizbullah's old heartland of the Bekaa.

Hizbullah is training hard for the anticipated conflict. The movement is attempting to acquire antiaircraft missiles for use against helicopters. But the IDF, away from the headlines, is training too. Military sources depict an army much transformed from the cumbersome, ill-prepared force of summer 2006. The change has come not only in training hours for infantry and armored forces; no less important, the IDF has moved away from a concept of limited operations designed to imprint a message in the enemy's consciousness. The emphasis has returned to high-speed ground warfare, intended to conquer and clear territory.

Despite Wednesday's fulsome praise of Hizbullah by the leaders of all factions in Lebanon, the scars left by May's sectarian fighting in west Beirut have not been forgotten. The damage that Lebanon would suffer in another war with Israel would be immense. The resentment of Hizbullah, currently simmering beneath the facade of unity, would be of corresponding magnitude.

Away from the headlines and the slogans, the Shi'ite population of the South also suffered in the 2006 war, and is in no great hurry to repeat the experience. Rubble and ruins are still much in evidence in the border towns of Maroun a-Ras and Aita a-Sha'ab - sometimes not far from the posters lauding the 2006 victory.

Hizbullah is not, of course, a movement dictated to by public sentiment. Still, the movement can ill afford to ignore the concerns of its core constituency.

None of this is to detract from the very real successes of Hizbullah and its allies, only to note that they come with a price. The "formula" for Hizbullah's success was to create a mode of warfare that supposedly neutralized Israel's advantages in conventional warfare. Emphasis was placed on the willingness to sacrifice and the elusiveness of Hizbullah's small cadre of fighters.

But as Hizbullah grows in political responsibilities and military strength, so it begins to look like something similar to a conventional power in its own right. Veteran Lebanon-watcher Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, recently said Hizbullah "has entered the cycle of full wars with Israel." This, he considers, places the movement in a "terrible bind." With power comes visibility. And with visibility - potentially - comes vulnerability.

So - will these underlying complexities and ambiguities serve eventually to stem the rise of a movement and bloc now rising to the zenith of its power? This, ultimately, will depend on whether Israel can (re-)acquire the focus, commitment, energy and imagination necessary to develop means to exploit these factors.

Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya Israel.

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Jonathan Spyer, "Self-radicalization" - Wed, Jul/30/08

Thu, 31 Jul 2008 18:28:09 GMT

Self-radicalization
Jonathan Spyer
The Jerusalem Post
July 30, 2008

Over the last two months, Israeli security forces have arrested six young Arab men suspected of seeking to form an extreme Islamist cell for the purpose of carrying out high-profile terror attacks in the capital. Two of the six held Israeli citizenship, while the other four were residents of east Jerusalem. It appears that they were radicalized through involvement in an Islamic study circle and via the Internet. Two Arab Israeli citizens from the town of Rahat were arrested in recent weeks on similar suspicions.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these events reflect strange, unfamiliar patterns. Place them on a broader canvas, however, and the novelty sharply decreases. The latest events appear to reflect the arrival of global jihad methods and codes of practice to our shores.

They are the most visible part of a broader and little-remarked-upon process taking place in Jerusalem, the West Bank and (particularly) in Gaza. This is the growing presence of preachers, organizations and individuals committed to the extreme Sunni Islamist current known as "Salafiyya." This is the ideology associated with al-Qaida. However, it is important to stress that what is happening is the penetration of ideas and models of activity, rather than the establishment of a new, centralized movement.

The process whereby young men become radicalized through contact with Islamist ideas via preachers or the Internet and then go on to form ad hoc terror cells has been observed in Muslim communities in Europe and further afield. So how is Salafism gaining its foothold west of the Jordan River? Through the relatively simple formula of preaching, education, the creation of groups of devotees, and the subsequent self-organization of those devotees.

In the West Bank, the removal of Hamas-affiliated imams in over 1,000 mosques has paradoxically opened the door for the rising prominence of Salafi-oriented preachers.

Some of the radical preachers are associated with the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) party. This veteran Islamist group was long regarded as a curiosity because of its failure to maintain an armed wing and its refusal to engage in active politics. However, HT has enjoyed an unprecedented rise in popularity in the West Bank over the last 18 months. Many of its imams are known to be in contact with the broader, amorphous Salafi subculture. HT itself is not a Salafi grouping. But its role as a radicalizing force and then a conduit for young men to violent activity is a key concern.

Salafi Imams with significant regional links are also active. The presence of a certain Saudi-Palestinian sheikh in the city of Nablus, for example, is attracting the attention of the authorities. This individual, whose brother is in a Saudi jail accused of al-Qaida ties, has been in Nablus since early 2008. He has a lot of money (presumably from supporters in Saudi Arabia), and has been engaging in 'Dawa' (outreach) activities, gathering around himself a circle of young activists committed to the Salafi-Jihadi path.

Despite the significance of their activities in the West Bank, it is Hamas-controlled Gaza that remains the key area of activity for the Salafis. In Gaza, the Salafis have been particularly engaged in activities associated with the enforcement of Islamic "morality," as they define it. These have included a rash of "honor killings" of both women and men. For example, members of the Salafi al-Saif al-Haq al-Islam vigilante group are considered responsible for the murder of the owner of the Teachers Bookshop - the only Christian bookshop in Gaza - on October 7 of last year. In the same month, Lina Suboh, daughter of a prominent Gaza university professor, was also murdered. These are two of hundreds of such killings that have taken place in Gaza over the last 18 months. They have been accompanied by bombings of various dens of iniquity in the Strip - including restaurants and cafes that allowed mixed dining.

But the Salafis are not concerned only with Palestinian internal moral health. Prominent individuals within existing political organizations are known to sympathize with this trend. This is particularly noticeable in Hamas's armed wing in Gaza, Izzadin Kassam. Sheikh Nizar Rayyan, a leading tactician in the group, is considered close to the Saudi-Palestinian imam mentioned above. Rayyan is the most prominent of a large number of individuals in Izzadin Kassam in Gaza who are known to adhere to the uncompromising ideas of Salafism.

With Fatah and Palestinian secular politics in decay, and Hamas facing the failures associated with governance in the real world, the stage is set for the further growth of the Salafi trend. Its growth should be placed within the context of a broader Islamization of Palestinian politics and society, in line with regional trends.

It is not possible to draw any causal link between the growth of Salafism and the "self-radicalization" associated with it, and the three acts of terror by apparently "self-radicalized" individuals in Jerusalem over the last months. Undoubtedly, however, behind the scenes, this is an angle of investigation energetically being pursued.

On Wednesday, the Israeli security cabinet held its first discussion ever on the issue of the global jihad. One may assume that this discussion was not held purely for the general education of cabinet members. Salafi-Jihadism, with its hard-to-trace links between idea and deed, its loose frameworks of organization, and its utterly uncompromising ambitions, has arrived among us.

Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya Israel.

Intelligence Guidance: Week of July 27, 2008

Tue, 29 Jul 2008 17:59:43 GMT

Intelligence Guidance: Week of July 27, 2008

Stratfor Today » July 25, 2008 | 2131 GMT

BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Jonathan Spyer, "Collision Course".

Thu, 17 Jul 2008 02:18:51 GMT

Collision Course
Jonathan Spyer
The Guardian
July 15, 2008

Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak this week called the Iranian nuclear issue "a challenge not just for Israel but for the entire world." He added that "Israel is the strongest country in the region and we have proven in the past that we are not deterred from acting when our vital interests are at stake."

Barak's statement reflected the extent of gravity and urgency felt in Israel regarding the ongoing march of Iranian nuclear ambitions. Such remarks do not necessarily portend immediately imminent confrontation. But they point to an underlying dynamic seemingly leading in the direction of conflict.

Israel has observed the unfolding of events in Iran over the recent half-decade with increasing trepidation. Israeli concerns are not purely focused on issues of military hardware. The rise within the Iranian clerical-led elite of an ultra-radical faction, centred on the Revolutionary Guards and represented at the highest level by President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, has been noted. Saeed Jalili, Iran's newly-appointed chief nuclear negotiator, is the latest representative of this group to come to international prominence.

The desire of this faction is to revive what they see as the authentic spirit of the revolutionary period, in the face of the waste, decay and corruption that is the reality of contemporary Iran. The drive to project Iranian power across the region is a vital aspect of this ambition. A nuclear capability would make this possible. Hatred of Israel is a genuinely felt sentiment in such circles. It is also a useful tool for building regional influence.

Israel sees the Iranian nuclear program within the framework of this picture. Israeli planners consider that the Iranians have been playing a clever game of buying time, and using the hopes of the international community to avoid conflict at all costs in order to make progress in their nuclear program. Unanswered questions continue to multiply.

A recent IAEA report noted evidence that Iran was with-holding information on high-explosives testing relating to its nuclear program. The report detailed military activities including attempts to develop a re-entry vehicle system designed to house a new payload for the Iranian Shihab-3 missile system.

The report stated that "The agency is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile-related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of these alleged studies and which Iran should share with the agency,"

Alongside the suspicions of Iranian covert projects to develop the military aspects of its nuclear program, the IAEA report also noted that Teheran now has 3,500 uranium centrifuges at its facility in Natanz.

The latest revelations indicate that Iran's Revolutionary Guards have set up a network of front companies to develop components for the advanced P2 gas centrifuge, which can enrich uranium to weapons grade two to three times faster than conventional P1 centrifuges - which Iran claims are in exclusive use at the Natanz conversion facility.

So from Israel's point of view, what is taking place is that a regime committed to its destruction appears to be in the ongoing process of developing what looks very much like a nuclear weapons program. The hesitant diplomacy of the international community, meanwhile, appears a poor tool for deterring the Teheran radicals. The incentives packages in return for suspension of enrichment - contemptuously brushed aside by the Iranians, the half hearted implementation of the three UNSC sanctions resolutions, and the evident desire to avoid confrontation at all costs are unlikely to strike fear into an IRGC man's heart.

A former senior Israeli defence official, speaking at a private gathering earlier this week, detailed four means, in reverse order of preference, by which the Iranians could be induced to abandon their nuclear program. These were: as a result of negotiations, as a result of sanctions, as a result of US military action, and, finally and least preferably, as a result of Israeli military action.

The former official gave a pessimistic overview of the progress made in the last years using the first two items. He noted that in a situation of extreme threat and lack of total clarity, the threatened party would have no choice but to act according to the worst-case scenario. Such statements should be taken seriously. They reflect an absolute determination to prevent the reality of Israelis being forced to live under the nuclear shadow of a state committed to their destruction.

Yet for all this, the underlying logic suggests that we are further from the end-game than might appear from the current saber-rattling. Informed US sources contend that the Iranian enrichment program is beset by technical difficulties and wrong turnings. These mean that despite the bluster, the Iranians are still a considerable distance from the point of nuclear weaponisation.

Whatever the accuracy of such statements, they suggest that the US is far from giving a ‘green light' to Israeli action against the Iranian nuclear program. Without such approval, an Israeli operation would probably for geographical reasons be a physical impossibility. So fears of imminent confrontation may be premature. Bluffing, brinkmanship and attempts at intimidation have all been much in evidence in the last days. But excessive focus on the theatrical element should not be allowed to obscure the underlying reality. As it stands, the current situation in the Middle East puts Islamist Iran on a collision course with the Jewish state.

Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya Israel.

8- [MERIA] Tony Badran, "Lebanon's Militia Wars". - Fri, Jul/11/08

Sun, 13 Jul 2008 06:37:58 GMT

[56] A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide to the Groups," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1997).

[57] Nicholas Blanford, "A Testing Time," The Middle East, December 1997. "Hizbollah is estimated to have between 500 and 600 hard core fighters--trained originally by Iran's Revolutionary Guards--and can draw upon a further 1,000 part time volunteers." See http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/is_n273/ai_n25024599.

[58] Whetten, "The Military Dimension," p. 88.

[59] Kassir, La guerre du Liban, p. 148. The P.pS.H. is the Soviet World War II-era submachine gun, PPSh-41, aka. Shpagin.

[60] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, p. 1.

[61] Kassir, La guerre du Liban, p. 149.

[62] Whetten pointed out that "the problems associated with the diversification of weapons was partially compensated for by the readily available new sources and a gradually widening range of arms." Whetten, "The Military Dimension," p. 87.

[63] Harb Lubnan, "al-infijar" ["The Explosion"]. Translation by this author.

[64] This is according to the account of an anonymous former Christian militia commander (seemingly in the NLP's "Tigers" militia) interviewed for the al-Jazeera documentary. "I used to see the boats unloading weapons in the Beirut port, and even in the Beirut airport, on the basis that these weapons were for the government, and they would be distributed to some parties." Harb Lubnan, "al-infijar" ["The Explosion"] . Translation by this author.

[65] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, pp. 41-47, and Appendix A, Table 4.

[66] Whetten, "The Military Dimension," p. 87.

[67] El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, pp. 332-35.

[68] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, pp. 15, 18, 46-47.

[69] Bavly and Salpeter, Fire in Beirut p. 53. "Periodically, an Israeli missile boat or a smaller Dabour-class gunboat would arrive at the bay of Junieh, towing a barge full of arms. The arms would be handed over and the empty barge would be towed back to its home port."

[70] Abu Khalil, Qissat al-mawarina fil harb, p. 61. See also Davie, "Comment Fait-on La Guerre ? Beyrouth?" p. 23.

[71] Bavly and Salpeter, Fire in Beirut, pp. 44-45.

[72] For a detailed discussion of the communications equipment, see Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas.

[73] Bavly and Salpeter, Fire in Beirut, pp. 45-46, 54.

[74] Ibid, p. 53. "Each item and each publication had to be supplied in duplicate."

[75] Harb lubnan, "al-infijar" ["The Explosion"]. Translation by this author. Hawi went on to relay an anecdote of how once Jumblatt protested to Arafat that the shipment was of old weapons. Arafat told him "well, you know the Soviets always give us old weapons and the Bulgarians give us from their old stocks," to which Jumblatt replied, "yes it's true, but they don't write on their guns abu al-mawt and abu al-jamajim and abu al-hawl!'" Translation by this author.

[76] ???, p. 93. See also the 1975 LAF intelligence report cited by El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, p. 302. See also Yezid Sayigh's discussion of the Palestinian move toward "regularization" during the 1970s, as well as his survey of their arsenal by 1982. Sayigh, "Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War."

[77] This is also recounted by Bazzi, Yasser Arafat Looked at Me and Smiled.

[78] Sayigh, "Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War," pp. 22-24.

[79] Bazzi describes how a Syrian officer headed a mortar unit, instructing SSNP fighters without any previous training how to set up the launching platform, including the trenches and ditches. Bazzi, Yasser Arafat Looked at Me and Smiled, pp. 13-14.

[80] Ibid, p. 52.

[81] Bazzi offers an example of these types of urban assault operations from the SSNP's battle with the Murabitun in Beirut in 1981. Ibid, pp. 6-7.

[82] This is substantiated in Bazzi's account of the command structure in the SSNP militia. See Bazzi, Yasser Arafat Looked at Me and Smiled.

[83] Ibid, p. 41.

[84] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, p. 54.

[85] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price list "the U.S. M-42, the Soviet ZU-23 and ZU-57, the Swiss Oerlikan, and the Hispano-Suiza 30." Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, p. 53.

[86] Ibid. "These weapons were employed against outside walls with devastating effect; they denuded structures with their high volume of firepower. In addition, used in a direct-fire capacity by firing the length of streets, AAA was a strong deterrent to assaults."

[87] Ibid, p. 40. "The zoom lens allowed Christian gunners to focus in on buildings and windows of buildings where the enemy was located. At distances from four to eight kilometers the ZU-57 proved very effective." For a picture of the monitor-equipped ZU in action in a rural setting in Mount Lebanon, see Joseph G. Chami, Lebanon, Days of Tragedy 75-76 (Transaction Books: London and New Brunswick, 1984), p. 190.

[88] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, pp. 51-52.

[89] Ibid, pp. 53-54.

[90] Davie, "Comment Fait-on La Guerre ? Beyrouth?"pp. 41-42.

[91] Ibid, p. 41.

[92] Chami, Lebanon, p. 195.

[93] See Bazzi's description of the SSNP assault on Tripoli. Bazzi, Yasser Arafat Looked at Me and Smiled,p. 53. The SSNP stronghold was in the Kura hills overlooking Tripoli. Also, a former Christian militiaman had related to me how artillery fire was used to provide cover for a small special operations unit on a sabotage mission that was pulling out from enemy territory. Private conversation, summer 1994.

[93] Ibid, p. 52.

[94] For a report with pictures, see al-Mustaqbal, December 23, 2006, http://almustaqbal.com/stories.aspx?StoryID=210750.

[95] "Lebanon's Army Will Keep Hizballah Seized Arms to Fight Israel," Ya Libnan, February 20, 2007. http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/02/lebanons_army_w.php.

[96] Al-Akhbar, May 10, 2008, http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/73087.

[97] The Guardian, May 10, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/10/lebanon.syria.

[98] The PSP claimed on its website (link no longer available) that at least 36 Hizballah fighters were killed. Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah admitted to 14 casualties in his speech on May 26, 2008.

[100] "Lebanon: 40 Sunni Officers Threaten to Resign," Asharq al-Awsat (English edition), May 15, 2008, http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=12758.

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7- [MERIA] Tony Badran, "Lebanon's Militia Wars". - Fri, Jul/11/08

Sun, 13 Jul 2008 06:32:28 GMT

NOTES

[1] For more detailed studies on the Palestinians, see, for example, Yezid Sayigh, "Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4. (Summer 1983), pp. 3-24.

[2] Ghassan Tueni, Une Guerre pour les Autres (Paris: Editions Latt?s, 1985).

[3] For a good study from this vantage point, see Farid El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).

[4] See the various anecdotes in Yussef Bazzi's Yasser Arafat Looked at Me and Smiled (Diary of a Fighter) (Beirut: Dar el-Kotob, 2005).

[5] Lawrence L. Whetten, "The Military Dimension," in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider (eds.), Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 88."Military expediencies required the enlistment of foreign military forces to advance the respective belligerents' goals."

[6] Paul Jureidini, R. D. McLaurin, and James Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, 1975-1978, Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Technical Memorandum 11-79, (June,1979), p. 7.

[7] Samir Kassir, La guerre du Liban: De la dissension nationale au conflit r?gional, 1975-1982 (Paris: Karthala/Cermoc, 1994), p. 150.

[8] Michael F. Davie, "Comment Fait-on La Guerre ? Beyrouth?" H?rodote, 2?me & 3?me trimestre, No. 29-30 (Geopolitique au Proche Orient), 1983, p. 41. "Cette situation ‘extr?me' a un but essentiellement politique et non militaire: elle ne sert qu'? imposer une conduite politique ? son adversaire en d?truisant son infrastructure ou son moral, mais sans entrer dans son territoire."

[9] Davie echoes a similar remark in 1983: "Les combats ont dur? pendant huit ann?es: Ils n'ont ‘servi' ? rien, puisque le seul but ?tait de tuer, ? partir de positions bien prot?g?es. La pens?e militaire derri?re ces op?rations ?tait nulle: il n'a jamais ?t? question de prendre d'assaut les positions de l'adversaire." Ibid, p. 38.

[10] Lewis W. Snider, "The Lebanese Forces: Their Origins and Role in Lebanon's Politics," Middle East Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Winter 1984), pp. 1-33.

[11] The definitive study on the Phalanges' organizational structure in the years before the 1975 war remains John P. Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kata'ib, 1936-1970 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).

[12] In his book on the Phalanges, Hazem Saghieh writes: "serious training and running [training] camps did not begin until 1969, the year of the April 23rd demonstration after the clash between the army and the Palestinian Resistance. However, the split of the Phalangist elements that went on to form the Tanzim, as we saw, suggests that this training was still limited and far from satisfying the more radical youth." See, Ta'rib al-kata'ib al-lubnaniyya: al-hizb, al-sulta, al-khawf (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1991), p. 163. Translation by this author.

[13] Veteran Phalangist official, Joseph Abu Khalil, described it thusly in his autobiography: "On the other hand, arms had begun to spread in people's hands, rather, the Phalanges had begun to arm themselves and to encourage the people to arm themselves since 1969--specifically after the state was forced to recognize the armed Palestinian presence and its right of movement in the infamous Cairo Accord. Since then, the Phalanges had been preparing themselves for a resistance that seemed, to them, necessary after the crippling of the army and removing it from its military and security duties." Joseph Abu Khalil, Qissat al-mawarina fil harb: Sira dhatiyya (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbu'at, 1990), pp. 17-18. Translation by this author.

[14] Saghieh, Ta'rib al-kata'ib al-lubnaniyya. "In 1972, the ‘P. G.' company was born and became ‘the only real regular company which could be considered as the nucleus of the Lebanese Forces.' The following year, the training became more serious, and that was the year that saw the May confrontations between the army and the [Palestinian] Resistance. In 1975, with the breakout of the war, each party local section [qism] would handle the confrontation in its district, except for the ‘P. G.' central company, which moved between sections." Translation by this author. "P. G." stood for Pierre Gemayel, but later came to stand for Bashir Gemayel. Both letters P and B are represented by the same letter in Arabic.

[15] Farid El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, p. 303.

[16] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, p. 6.

[17] See Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985, revised edition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 65. See also, Marius Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 25-28.

[18] Harb Lubnan [The War of Lebanon], "al-infijar" ["The Explosion"], Episode 3, al-Jazeera Productions, 2001. Transcript gleaned from the audible parts of the audio in English and translated from al-Jazeera's dubbed-over Arabic translation.

[19] Dan Bavly and Eliahu Salpeter, Fire in Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the PLO (New York: Stein & Day, 1984), p. 52.

[20] Snider, "The Lebanese Forces," pp. 6-7, footnote 4.

[21] Ibid, pp. 6-7, footnote 4.

[22] Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War, p. 29.

[23] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas,p. 57, note 1.

[24] Ibid, p. 15.

[25] Ibid.

[26] See Mordechai Nisan, The Conscience of Lebanon: A Political Biography of Etienne Sakr (Abu-Arz) (London: Frank Cass/Taylor & Francis, 2003). See also, Mordechai Nisan, "Dossier: Etienne Saqr (Abu Arz)," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 2003), http://www.meib.org/articles/0301_ld.htm.

[27] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, p. 15. They provide the total number of "c. 750" in Appendix A, Table 2. Nisan, "Dossier," provides a total of "about 1,000."

[28] Nisan, "Dossier." "In March 1976, they confronted Palestinian and leftist forces in West Beirut. A Guardians unit was also dispatched to Zaarour, above the mountain road to Zahle, to support Phalangist forces. In April, Guardian fighters defended a line in the area of Hadeth, Kfar Shima, and Bsaba, south of Beirut, against a coalition of Palestinian, PSP, and SSNP forces."

[29] For a detailed look at the LF circa 1982, see Snider, "The Lebanese Forces."

[30] Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, fourth printing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, 1984), p. 77.

[31] El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, p. 302, based on the same 1975 LAF intelligence report.

[32] Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War, p. 66.

[33] Harb lubnan, "al-fawda" ["Chaos"], Episode 12. Translation by this author.

[34] El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, p. 303, based on the 1975 LAF intelligence report.

[35] Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War, p. 66.

[36] Ibid, pp. 66-67.

[37] El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, p. 303.

[38] Ibid, pp. 332-33.

[39] Private conversation, May 2008.

[40] Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, p. 6.

[41] El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, p. 303. Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price list their force size at 300, although they point out that during the Battle of the Hotels, "60 [fighters] were committed on any given day." Jureidini, McLaurin, and Price, Military Operations in Selected Lebanese Built-up Areas, p. 6, and Appendix A, Table 2. Walid Khalidi cites a higher number of 500, which is probably too high. Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1983), p. 77.

[42] Harb lubnan, "al-fawda" ["Chaos"].

[43] For more on these groups, see Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War, pp. 68-69.

[44] As related by George Hawi in Harb Lubnan, "awdat dimashq," [Damascus Returns], Episode 13.

[45] El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, pp. 332-35.

[46] Ibid.

[47] See Bazzi, Yasser Arafat Looked at Me and Smiled, pp. 13-14, 45, 50, 52. Bazzi, a former SSNP militiaman himself, offers an excellent, tragically comical account of his days with the militia, providing detailed insights into the militia's involvement in the war, its armament, and its command structure. In many respects, the picture that emerges contrasts quite significantly on many of details (e.g., when it comes to discipline) with the account offered by Ehud Ya'ari in his article "Behind the Terror," The Atlantic Monthly, June 1987, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/87jun/yaari.htm.

[48] El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, p. 302. Ya'ari, "Behind the Terror."

[49] Bazzi, Yasser Arafat Looked at Me and Smiled, p. 52.

[50] Ibid, p. 7.

[51] Ibid, p. 52.

[52] Sayigh, "Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War," pp. 17-18. For lists of numbers based on LAF intelligence reports from 1975-76, see El-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, Table 22.1, 22.2, and 24.1.

[53] See Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (London: IB Tauris, 1986), pp. 168-75.

[54] Both Walid Jumblatt and George Hawi were summoned to Damascus and given a stern message that Amal was a "red line" and that the PSP-LCP campaign against it should stop immediately. Jumblatt and Hawi personally related this incident in harb lubnan, "awdat dimashq" ["Damascus Returns"].

[55] For more on these aspects and their role in the organizational structure of Hizballah, see Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). See also Martin Kramer, "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad," in M. Marty and R.S. Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance (The Fundamentalism Project, Vol. 3) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 539-56, http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Calculus.htm.

6- [MERIA] Tony Badran, "Lebanon's Militia Wars". - Fri, Jul/11/08

Sun, 13 Jul 2008 06:28:38 GMT

CONCLUSIONS

Several of the lessons of the civil war were confirmed once again during Hizballah's offensive.

The most significant recurring lesson was that regardless of military capabilities, militias were not really able to take over and/or hold positions in hostile territory, outside its direct area of influence. This was a feature of the civil war, and it was seen, for example, with the failure of the well-equipped Lebanese Forces in the Shuf Mountains and later in East Sidon to hold their advanced positions. Such positions are not sustainable or defensible, and "outsiders"--even well-trained and equipped ones, like Hizballah--can be repelled and made to sustain significant casualties.

The weaponry did not change much from the time of the war. The same type of weapons remain in use today, even if in newer versions (e.g., the M4A1): assault rifles, RPGs, sniper rifles, mortars, truck/jeep-mounted recoilless rifles and heavy machine guns, as well as rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns.

Battles to control strategic and access routes will continue to remain central to the fighting, especially with Hizballah's need to link up its three non-contiguous areas of influence and the ability of its opponents to block that access.

Also, access to secure ports would be crucial if war were to break out again, as evident from the calls to rehabilitate the Juniya port--which played a central role for the Christian militias in the civil war--and the Mu'awwad airport.

Finally, as with the civil war, the role of regional actors and the international community will likely be decisive. Syria and Iran would continue to support Hizballah and Amal and their smaller allies. Meanwhile, the potential exists for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan to support the March 14 Sunni-Druze-Christian coalition. What the effect of such presumed regional roles will be cannot be stated with certainty. What role Israel might play is also unsure. Would Israel insert itself in a conflict in Lebanon? It is most likely safe to assume that the countries contributing to UNIFIL in southern Lebanon would withdraw their troops.

The role of the Palestinians, however, will be markedly different. The Syrians still maintain the armed proxies of the PFLP-GC and Fatah Intifada, which maintain bases in the Biqa' and in the southern coastal town of Na'ma. They are likely to play a supporting role alongside Hizballah, Amal, and the SSNP. What role Fatah and other smaller Islamist organizations decide to play is unclear. Sunni Islamists would also be a wildcard in such a conflict.

The biggest question, however, is whether all these elements could once again ensure that a renewed war in Lebanon would be another stalemate, or if the unitary state would survive at all this time.

*Tony Badran is a Research Fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where he focuses on Lebanon and Syria. His articles have appeared in the Los Angeles Times, Middle East Quarterly, and Beirut Daily Star, among other places. He also authors the weblog, "Across the Bay" and is the editor of the Syrian Opposition Portal, a website tracking the news of the Syrian opposition movements. Mr. Badran is currently completing his doctorate at New York University.

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8- [MERIA] Tony Badran, "Lebanon's Militia Wars". - Fri, Jul/11/08

7- [MERIA] Tony Badran, "Lebanon's Militia Wars". - Fri, Jul/11/08

6- [MERIA] Tony Badran, "Lebanon's Militia Wars". - Fri, Jul/11/08

Avraham's One Village - JEWISH & benei Noach's ONE VILLAGE Barukh haba: Middle East